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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
PROPERTY DIVISIONS AT DIVORCE
By Margaret Ryznar*
Abstract
Much has been written about family law and how to fairly
divide property between divorcing spouses. Without a good
understanding of what courts are doing in the field, however,
there is no baseline for theoretical frameworks. This Article fills
the void by analyzing all divorce cases involving children that
were filed in one county over several months. The resulting
empirical data has implications for the meaning of fairness in
divorce, the role of judicial discretion, and the incentives for
contracting by couples. This Article also examines the
underlying law in order to explore the correlation between the
family law code and judicial outcomes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, nearly two million people divorce in the United
States, and over four million marry.1 They have kids, and if
nothing else, they venture into romantic relationships. Yet,
they know little about the family laws that pick up the pieces of
broken relationships and set the price of love. One woman did
not even know that a divorce would end her marriage.2 While
that may be extreme, most people do not know that the law
treats non-married couples like strangers, and many engaged
couples think they have no chance of divorce—but nothing
could be further from the truth.3
In a grey universe such as family law, where discretionary
standards govern factually diverse cases, little can be
measured.4
This makes it more difficult for courts,
*Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University McKinney School of
Law. Many thanks to Susan David deMaine and Jessica Dickinson for their
excellent research assistance, as well as to Heather Kinser, Jordan Porter,
Sarah Thurman, and Ne’Cole Whyde. Thanks also to Margaret Brinig for her
invaluable assistance and Pace Law Review for editing assistance. This
project was generously supported by a Research Support Funds Grant
(RSFG) from IUPUI.
1. National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm (last visited Mar.
22, 2017).
2. Tomas Jivanda, Woman Claims Lawyers Should Have Told Her
Divorce Would End Her Marriage, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/woman-claims-lawyersshould-have-told-her-divorce-would-end-her-marriage-9051550.html.
3. SONIA HARRIS-SHORT & JOANNA MILES, FAMILY LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 109 (2d ed. 2011); Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations:
Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts,
and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 757 (2009).
4. “[S]cholars and lawmakers have recognized that litigating under
open-ended, amorphous standards [in family law] is unpredictable . . . .”
Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2003, 2006 (2014). The field of family law is certainly no stranger to
greyness. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in
Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1167
(1986) (“Family law . . . is characterized by more discretion than any other
field of private law.”). In fact, the two major inquiries when a marriage ends
relate to the division of property and child-related matters such as child
custody and support. The latter is governed by the notoriously ambiguous
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policymakers, lawmakers, and litigants to know what to do in a
particular case.
Thus, this Article offers an empirical analysis of one set of
data, which shows the actions of the courts and the outcomes
for divorcing couples. Analyzing approximately 110 divorce
cases filed over three months in 2008 in Marion County, this
Article focuses on property divisions, specifically those of
pensions and marital homes, which are the most significant
assets that couples own.5 In regards to these, this Article looks
at the mandates of the Indiana legislature on property division
and to what extent the courts are following them. Accordingly,
Part II sets forth the Indiana legal framework against which
divorces occur. Part III analyzes the data to examine how the
courts are working within this legal framework. There may be
a divergence between theory and practice, and empirical
research measures it.
The resulting empirical data has
implications for the meaning of fairness in divorce, the role of
judicial discretion, and the incentives and background for
contracting by couples.
In many ways, Indiana is representative of other state
approaches to property division.6 For example, Indiana takes
the majority approach of equitable distribution as opposed to
community property.7 Thus, the lessons learned from an

“child’s best interests,” while the former is governed by fairness. See, e.g.,
William J. Howe & Hugh McIssac, Finding the Balance: Ethical Challenges
and Best Practices for Lawyers Representing Parents when the Interests of
Children are at Stake, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 78, 78-79 (2008) (“Virtually every
jurisdiction . . . seeks to achieve the best interests of the child when resolving
divorce, custody, or parenting disputes.”); Marsha Garrison, What’s Fair in
Divorce Property Distribution: Cross-National Perspectives from Survey
Evidence, 72 LA. L. REV. 57, 58 (2011) (“All divorce property-distribution
systems aim to achieve a fair division of spousal assets.”).
5. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW
614 (2016) (“In addition to the marital home, pension benefits constitute the
most significant marital asset for many couples. They also serve as an
important source of funds for meeting support obligations.”).
6. However, state law governs divorce, making any generalization
difficult. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (“Rules governing
the inheritance of property, adoption, and child custody are generally
specified in statutory enactments that vary from State to State. Moreover,
equally varied state laws governing marriage and divorce affect a multitude
of parent-child relationships.”).
7. See infra Part II.B.
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empirical analysis of Indiana apply to other states and are
essential given that in Indiana, as anywhere, the division of
property is among the biggest issues when a couple divorces.8
With continued high levels of divorce in the United States and
around the world, it is important to study this area of law,
particularly in respect to two significant implications.
First, the family law conversation has moved on from the
question of unilateral or fault divorce, and now divorces occur
freely, raising the question of what is fair in the property
division at divorce.9 Second, there has been a trend towards
reducing family law to formulae, as seen in the child support
guidelines and parenting time guidelines, but there are limits
to this in the property division realm.10
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Even statutorily, before the facts of a particular case
muddy the equation, property division is notoriously grey.
While other areas of law have clear guidelines to assist courts
in reaching their decisions, a common guideline in divorce
property division is the ambiguous notion of fairness.
To facilitate fairness, property division often proceeds in
two stages. The first is applying state law to determine the
assets to be divided, which is generally governed by state
statutory law.11 The second is the actual division of assets
8. “The fact that not just specialists and dedicated proponents, but also
broad swaths of scholars, courts, and decisionmakers, are grappling with
data is a sign of the empirical revolution’s vitality.” Daniel E. Ho & Larry
Kramer, Introduction: The Empirical Revolution in Law, 65 STAN. L. REV.
1195, 1202 (2013).
9. See, e.g., Mirenda Watkins, Divorce, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1033
(2006) (exploring contemporary issues in divorce).
10. “Even if the contested issues in a divorce are limited to child custody
and visitation, statutory child support guidelines and shared parenting
requirements usually come into play.” Debra Berman & James Alfini,
Lawyer Colonization of Family Mediation: Consequences and Implications, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 887, 912 (2012).
11. These statutes vary among the states. For example, the relevant
Illinois statute divides only marital property. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/503(a)-(b) (2017). Furthermore, there is a rebuttable presumption that
property acquired during marriage is marital property that is divisible upon
divorce. Id. Finally, property gained before marriage or by gift does not
qualify as marital property. Id.
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under state law,12 with debts often treated the same way as
assets.13 If enforced by the court, a valid premarital agreement
may change this framework.14
Indiana is no different:
[T]he law governing the division of marital
property . . . is a two-step process in Indiana.
First, the trial court determines what property
must be included in the marital estate. It is well
established that all marital property goes into
the marital pot for division, whether it was
owned by either spouse before the marriage,
acquired by either spouse after the marriage and
before final separation of the parties, or acquired
by their joint efforts. This “one-pot” theory
ensures that all assets are subject to the trial
court’s power to divide and award. While the
trial court may ultimately determine that a
particular asset should be awarded solely to one
spouse, it must first include the asset in its
consideration of the marital estate to be divided.
After determining what constitutes marital
property, the trial court must then divide the
marital property under the presumption that an
equal split is just and reasonable.
This
presumption may be rebutted by a party who
presents relevant evidence . . . .15
12. See Margaret Ryznar, All’s Fair in Love and War: But What About
in Divorce? The Fairness of Property Division in American and English Big
Money Divorce Cases, 86 N.D. L. REV. 115 (2010). The relevant Illinois
statute is typical in listing the factors that courts should consider when
dividing marital property. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503(a)-(b) (2017).
13. See, e.g., Capehart v. Capehart, 705 N.E.2d 533 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(noting that the husband’s premarital educational debt should have been
included in the marital pot, but the fact that it was premarital rebutted the
presumption of equal division).
14. The premarital agreement must be substantively and procedurally
fair. See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar & Anna Stepień-Sporek, To Have and To
Hold, For Richer or Richer: Premarital Agreements in the Comparative
Context, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 27 (2009).
15. Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(citations omitted). See also Love v. Love, 10 N.E.3d 1005, 1013 (Ind. Ct.
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Each of these steps is considered next in turn.
A. Defining Property Subject to Division
The threshold question of any property division is the
definition of property.16 The Indiana Code provides some
guidance, as does Indiana case law.17 The most important
division for many people is that of the marital house, which is
often the most significant asset that people own other than
their retirement accounts.

App. 2014) (“It is well-established that all marital property goes into the
marital pot for division, whether it was owned by either spouse before the
marriage, acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before final
separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts.”). See also Hartley
v. Hartley, 862 N.E.2d 274, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), which states:
In determining the value of the marital estate, the trial
court is required to include property owned by either spouse
before the marriage, acquired by either spouse in his or her
own right after the marriage and before final separation of
the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts. This “one-pot”
theory insures that all assets are subject to the trial court’s
power to divide and award.
Id. (citations omitted).
16. See, e.g., O’Connell v. O’Connell, 889 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008) (“First, the trial court determines what property must be included in
the marital estate.”). For example, in Indiana, pets are treated as property,
like in the majority of states. At least one Indiana court has recognized the
gravity to couples of the division of their pets:
Were we to judge the importance of these proceedings by
such a fictitious standard of value we would be inclined to
resent this appeal as a trespass on the court’s time and an
imposition on our patience, of which quality we trust we are
possessed in reasonable degree. But we have in mind
Senator Vest’s immortal eulogy on the noble instincts of a
dog so we approach the question involved without any
feeling of injured dignity but with a full realization that no
man can be censured for the prosecution of his rights to the
full limit of the law when such rights involve the comfort
derived from the companionship of man’s best friend.
Akers v. Sellers, 54 N.E.2d 779, 779 (Ind. App. 1944).
17. IND. CODE § 31-9-2-98 (2016). This provision is particularly relevant
to vested versus non-vested pensions and retirement plans.
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1. Pensions
Pensions must be vested in order to be subject to division
in an Indiana divorce.18 A non-vested pension plan will not be
considered a marital asset in Indiana, unlike in some other
states.19 However, “if the right to such benefits is fixed, such
benefits are a valuable asset [for division] even though there is
no present right to receive income.”20
The question of when a pension vests can be unclear.
Indiana case law offers some help in this regard. In one case,
the Indiana Court of Appeals has determined that a clear test
is whether a person can receive pension payments; in that case,
because the husband could currently receive payments from his
pension plan, the pension constituted divisible property.21 In
another case, the husband’s “interest in the employercontributed portion of his 401(k) plan was contingent upon his
retirement at the company. Thus, [the husband’s] interest was
18. See § 31-9-2-98(b). See also Bingley v. Bingley, 935 N.E.2d 152, 155
(Ind. 2010) (“[V]esting is both a necessary and sufficient condition for a right
to a benefit to constitute an asset.”).
19. 2 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 6:22 (3d
ed. Supp. 2016). Almost all states consider vested pensions as marital
property. Only a few states, including Indiana, exclude non-vested pensions
from marital property division. Id. at 140. “There is no relevant distinction
for equitable distribution purposes between retirement plans where the
employer made all the contributions (noncontributory plans) and plans to
which both the employee and employer contributed (contributory plans).” Id.
See also Moyars v. Moyars, 717 N.E.2d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
20. Moyars, 717 N.E.2d at 980. Employee-funded IRA’s are subject to
similar rules. See, e.g., Wortkoetter v. Wortkoetter, 971 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2012), which states:
[A]lthough the IRA was established by Husband before the
marriage, most of the appreciation occurred during the
marriage. Additionally, the trial court was not required to
set aside to Husband the value of the IRA, even though Wife
made no contribution to its acquisition. Rather, the trial
court was required to follow the statutory presumption
absent evidence that an equal division would not be just and
reasonable. We conclude that the court acted within its
discretion when, in accordance with the statutory
presumption, it declined to award Husband his IRA
exclusively and, instead, equally divided all property of the
parties.
Id. (citations omitted).
21. Hill v. Hill, 863 N.E.2d 456, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

7

596

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37:2

not vested in the employer-contributed portion of the
retirement plan. An unvested interest in property is not
divisible as a marital asset.”22
In determining a property division, courts may consider
whether, and to what extent, the spouse acquired the pension
prior to the marriage. Tax penalties for early withdrawal from
the pension plan can also be considered.23 Valuing a pension
can be difficult and there are several approaches.24
22. Harris v. Harris, 690 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
23. See Qazi v. Qazi, 546 N.E.2d 866, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (finding
that it was reasonable to allow husband to keep possession of his retirement
account in order to avoid the tax consequences of liquidating prior to
retirement age; in order to offset this distribution, husband was ordered to
pay scheduled cash payments to wife over time). But see Irvine v. Irvine, 685
N.E.2d 67, 71 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Unlike the situation in Qazi, where the
court found that the tax consequences of the distribution were speculative,
the Irvine court found that the tax consequences were not speculative
because the trial court had ordered husband to pay an immediate lump sum
amount to wife, rather than scheduled payments spread out over time. Id.
The Court stated that:
review of the assets of the parties subject to a division under
the terms of the agreement reveals approximately $150,000
in cash—leaving almost a $250,000 difference [since
husband was ordered to pay wife lump sum amount of
$392,385 in case]. In order for [husband] to immediately
obtain $250,000 in cash, [husband] would have to liquidate
his $614,348.12 pension plan . . . [T]here are not sufficient
assets in the marital pot to allow [husband] to meet the trial
court’s plan of immediate distribution without liquidating
his pension plan. Rather, the terms of the trial court’s
distribution plan necessarily require [husband] to liquidate
the plan. Therefore, the tax consequences of early
liquidation were not speculative and should have been
considered.
Id.
24. The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Gray v. Gray stated:
There are several ways of valuing a pension plan. One is
the “immediate offset” method, which is advocated by Dan
Gray in this case and which consists of reducing the lifetime
value of the pension benefits to present value and awarding
the marital share of that present value to the non-owning
spouse in the form of cash or other property. The other
method is the “deferred distribution” method, where the
trial court does not divide the pension immediately but
instead determines a percentage of the monthly pension
benefit that the non-owning spouse is entitled to; the non-
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Most future earnings of contingent benefits are also not
divisible in Indiana. These include workers’ compensation
benefits intended to replace future wages, eventual proceeds
from pending personal injury actions, and many disability
pensions.25 Similarly, educational degrees are not divisible in
most states, including Indiana.26 This is consistent with the
general clean break principle in family law.27
2. Marital Home
Similar to pensions and other retirement benefits, the
marital home is a major portion of a couple’s property. In
dividing the home, courts may examine who earned the marital
house, whether it was earned before the marriage, or whether
there was commingling of the parties’ assets to pay the

owning spouse then enjoys that share when the owning
spouse begins drawing retirement.
Gray v. Gray, 101 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Ark. 2003) (citations omitted). Like with
anything, there are advantages and disadvantages to each. Id. (outlining the
advantages and disadvantages of both approaches).
25. The Supreme Court of Indiana has stated:
[A] future income stream may be a marital asset to the
extent that either marital assets were used to acquire the
future income or the income is future compensation for past
services, as opposed to replacement for lost earning capacity
due to disability. But if both factors are absent, a disability
income stream is not a marital asset.
Severs v. Severs, 837 N.E.2d 498, 500 (Ind. 2005).
26. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Roberts, 670 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996); Lauren F. Redman, Domesticity and the Texas Community Property
System, 16 BUFF. WOMEN’S L. J. 23, 28 (2008).
27. Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A
Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1209-10 (1999) (“[T]he
law currently expresses a preference for a ‘clean break’ at divorce.”). See also
Caddo v. Caddo, 468 N.E.2d 593, 593-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), which stated:
In its division of property the [trial] court awarded the
marital residence to the wife and awarded the husband
$24,000, “[s]aid payment to be non-interest bearing until
due and payable and to become due and payable upon the
happening of the first of the following contingencies: Wife
remarries; The marital home is sold; or, The youngest child
becomes emancipated.”
Id. The Appellate court found “that expressing this contingency in terms of
‘emancipation’ renders the judgment too uncertain to meet” the objective
“that property rights be settled with certainty at the time of the dissolution.”
Id. at 594.
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mortgage or make improvements.28 In Indiana, the marital
home is divisible and may be sold to facilitate an appropriate
distribution of property.29
However, there is always the argument that the custodial
parent should keep the home so that the children do not have
to relocate. Thus, a factor that may affect the award of the
marital home is the “desirability of awarding the family
residence or the right to dwell in the family residence.”30 This
is in line with the national trend of limiting post-divorce
changes for children,31 with the goal being to protect the
28. See Brett Turner, Unlikely Partners: The Marital Home and the
Concept of Separate Property, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 69 (2006).
Turner states:
This article will examine the current state of American
matrimonial law on classification and division of the marital
home. It will conclude that the general rule set forth in the
case law is correct. The marital home should not always
constitute marital property; rather, it should be classified
under the same set of rules that apply to other assets.
Treating the marital home as marital property will not
result in a better division of the marital home between
divorcing spouses. It will instead provide a strong incentive
for spouses who own separate property to avoid investing
that property in the marital home—a result which will
harm all families, married as well as divorced. When all
consequences are properly considered, a better policy result
is reached by rejecting special rules of classification aimed
only at the marital home.
Id. at 69-70 (citations omitted). On the issue of commingling, see infra Part
II.B.2.
29. See IND. CODE § 31-15-7-4 (2016).
30. See IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5(3) (2016).
31. 27C C.J.S. DIVORCE § 958 (2017) (“The homestead may be awarded
to the custodial parent, either unrestricted as to time, or until emancipation
of the children or the youngest child reaches a specified age.”). See also Lee
R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Effect of Trial Court Giving
Consideration to Needs of Children in Making Property Division, 19 A.L.R.4th
239 (1983). Russ stated:
[C]ourts have considered the needs of the parties’ children
in determining how the parties’ marital property should be
divided. . . . In disposing of the family home, which is often
the sole or major asset of the parties, the courts have
considered such factors as the need of the parties’ children
for a stable environment during the time of the parents’
divorce, the desirability of keeping the children in the same
school, the fact that mortgage payments are often less than
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children implicated by a divorce.32
Indiana courts have split on the question of whether the
house should be awarded to the custodial parent. In one case,
it was “a just and reasonable division of property” to “allow
Wife to remain in the marital residence for the benefit of the
parties’ children.”33 However, while it may be desirable to
award the marital home to the custodial parent, the court need
not necessarily do it.34 Indeed, the outcomes of divorce cases on
this topic vary.35 Occasionally, there is a transition period to
allow one spouse time to move or to permit home repairs.36
what the custodial parent would pay for similar housing,
and the financial ability of the parties to maintain two
households, and have reached, under the particular
circumstances of each case, differing conclusions as to the
propriety of awarding the custodial parent the exclusive
right to use the family home during the minority of the
children or for other periods of time.
Id. at §§1[a], 2[a] (citations omitted).
32. See, e.g., Kara Francis, A Remedy Beyond Reach: The Stringent
Standard in Illinois for Exclusive Possession of the Marital Home During
Divorce Proceedings, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 803 (2014) (offering a useful
discussion on the need to grant one party exclusive possession of the marital
home in certain high-conflict divorce situations while dissolution proceedings
are underway).
33. Krasowski v. Krasowski, 691 N.E.2d 469, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
34. In re Marriage of Rupp, 449 N.E.2d 1164, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
35. See Swinney v. Swinney, 419 N.E.2d 996, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981),
which stated:
[While] custody may well be enough by itself to support the
custodial parent’s use of the family residence for a period of
time, [the court] feel[s] that fact alone will not support an
award of the residence to the wife when the residence is, in
essence, the sole marital asset. Without some other
offsetting factor, such an award is not just and reasonable.
Id.
36. The Court of Appeals of Indiana in Keown v. Keown stated:
The trial court ordered [wife] to make the repairs because
they were “necessary for sale.” Thus, the repair costs are a
direct result of the trial court’s order requiring [wife] to sell
the residence . . . It was within the trial court’s discretion to
determine whether to reduce the marital property’s value by
this amount after determining that the repairs were
necessary for sale.
Keown v. Keown, 883 N.E.2d 865, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). See also Webb v.
Schleutker, 891 N.E.2d 1144, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (allowing a wife to
remain living in the marital home for three months after the final
dissolution).
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Thus, the courts have discretion to order the residence to be
sold.37
B. Property Division Methods
The second question regarding property division is how to
divide the property once it is identified. The main guideline is
fairness to the divorcing spouses.38
Lawmakers have
implemented different approaches to achieving fairness in
divorce.
1. General Approaches
Legislators around the world have searched for the
meaning of fairness in property division at divorce. There are
two main approaches in the United States: equitable division
and community property.39
A minority of states utilize community property, under
which approach spouses hold property together during the
marriage.40 At divorce, this often results in an equal property
37. See, e.g., Herron v. Herron, 457 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983). In that case, the wife claimed that the sale should be delayed for eight
years while the children were still in the home. Id. However, this would
have required husband to “continue making house payments in the interim,
in addition to child support payments.” Id. The house was the most valuable
asset to be divided, with relatively little other property to be divided. Id.
(“Thus, the court could not have awarded [wife] the house outright without
giving her the lion’s share of the marital property.”); see also Melissa J.
Avery, The Marital Residence and Other Black Holes: Dealing with Real
Estate in Divorce, 53 RES GESTAE 30 (October 2009) (describing the options
available for disposition of the marital residence, particularly when the
housing market was performing poorly; the options discussed include sale of
the home, refinance of the mortgage in order to buy out one spouse, or sale of
the property at auction).
38. See Ryznar, supra note 12, at 117.
39. The details vary by state. See, e.g., Mary Moers Wenig, Increase in
Value of Separate Property During Marriage: Examination and Proposals, 23
FAM. L. Q. 301, 303 (1989).
40. Wendy Goffe, Yours, Mine and Ours: An Introduction to the Laws of
the U.S. Community Property States, Remarks at Estate Planning
Essentials: Marital Deductions Post-DOMA and Community Property (July
9,
2014)
(transcript
available
at
http://files.alicle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/VCWB0709_chapter_02_thumb.p
df). Goffe stated:
Nine states use a community property system to determine
ownership and management of property of married
couples . . . This outline identifies those core principles and
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division between the spouses.41
However, most states are common law, where the spouses
hold their property during the marriage separately by
default.42 For these states, the principle that governs property
division is equitable distribution, “which seeks an equitable,
but not necessarily equal, division between the spouses;”43 in
other words, fairness is sought in the property division.44
Equitable distribution is like partnership dissolution:
although the partners have a partnership stake, the stakes are
not necessarily equal.45 At the dissolution, the partners receive
shares equal to their contributions.46 In the marital context,
however, contributions need not be financial and include child
care.47
In applying the equitable distribution approach, courts
may consider the length of the marriage, the age and health of
the spouses, as well as the vocational skills, income, liabilities,
and needs of each spouse.48 Courts have significant discretion
in property division, with their decisions often being factspecific.49
points out the major variations in the different state
systems. The outline addresses characterization of property
as community or separate, management authority over the
property by the spouses and, to a limited extent, creditor
rights in the property.
Id. at 39.
41. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2550-56 (2017). In the community
property system, each spouse has an interest in the community property, as
opposed to separate spousal property holdings. Ira Mark Ellman, O’Brien v.
O’Brien: A Failed Reform, Unlikely Reformers, 27 PACE L. REV. 949, 951
(2007).
42. See supra Part II.B.1.
43. Ryznar, supra note 12, at 119.
44. Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce: Equitable Distribution Doctrine,
41 A.L.R.4th 481 (1985). See also 2 MARITAL PROP. L. § 43:1 (2d ed. 2016)
(“Most jurisdictions have enacted statutes calling for property to be divided
equitably, justly, fairly, or the like, without regard to which party holds legal
title.”).
45. Ryznar, supra note 12, at 120. TURNER, supra note 19, at § 8:1.
46. Ryznar, supra note 12, at 120.
47. Id. at 120-21. See also TURNER, supra note 19, at § 8:10.
48. Ryznar, supra note 12, at 121. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-8182 (2016); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504 (2016). See also 3 BRETT TURNER,
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY, Appendix A (3d ed. Supp. 2016).
49. Ryznar, supra note 12, at 121.
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However, debate continues regarding the fairest property
division at divorce.50 Disagreement between spouses on this
question has also fueled much litigation.51
2. Indiana Approach
Some jurisdictions have defaulted to the meaning of
equitable as equality between the spouses, with the
opportunity to rebut an equal division. These jurisdictions
include some equitable distribution states, such as Indiana.52
According to the Indiana family law code,”[t]he court shall
presume that an equal division of the marital property between
the parties is just and reasonable.”53 Thus, the Indiana
legislature has decided that the starting point should be an
equal division, and that courts should attempt to achieve it.54
An equal property division can be reached by several
arrangements of property.55
50. Id. at 120.
51. Id. See, e.g., Wendt v. Wendt, No. FA96 0149562 S, 1998 WL
161165 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998), aff’d, 757 A.2d 1225 (Conn. App. Ct.
2000).
52. Katharine Baker, Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law,
stated:
Gradually, though, courts have reached consensus on an
understanding of equitable. It means equal—usually. Over
time, relying in part on norms from some community
property states, in part on various theories of partnership
and promise, but also just craving a baseline from which to
operate, many states have developed presumptions of a
fifty-fifty split. Six states codify the fifty-fifty division
presumption in their statutes, but many more have adopted
the rules judicially.
Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The
Standardization of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 U.
ILL. L. REV. 319, 334 (2012).
53. IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5 (2016).
54. The adoption of the yardstick of equality by the House of Lords in
White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. (HL) 596, is among the most internationally
recognized equality standards, resulting in London’s reputation as the capital
of divorce in the world. See Ryznar, supra note 12, at 115.
55. IND. CODE § 31-15-7-4 (b) states:
(b) The court shall divide the property in a just and
reasonable manner by:
(1) division of the property in kind;
(2) setting the property or parts of the property over to one
(1) of the spouses and requiring either spouse to pay an
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However, either spouse may rebut the presumption of
equal division.56 Specifically, there are five factors listed in the
Indiana Code that may be presented to the court in order to
rebut the presumption.57 The trial court should consider all of
these statutory factors in dividing property, but need not

amount, either in gross or in installments, that is just and
proper;
(3) ordering the sale of the property under such conditions
as the court prescribes and dividing the proceeds of the sale;
or
(4) ordering the distribution of benefits described in IC 31-92-98(b)(2) or IC 31-9-2-98(b)(3) that are payable after the
dissolution of marriage, by setting aside to either of the
parties a percentage of those payments either by
assignment or in kind at the time of receipt.
Id.
56. See, e.g., Weigel v. Weigel, 24 N.E.3d 1007, 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)
(“The burden of proving the value of marital assets is, and should be, on the
parties to the dissolution.”) (quoting Houchens v. Boschert, 758 N.E.2d 585,
588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)); Morgal-Henrich v. Henrich, 970 N.E.2d 207, 211
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“A party seeking to rebut the presumption of equal
division of marital property bears the burden of proof in doing so.”); 14 J.
ERIC SMITHBURN, INDIANA PRACTICE, FAMILY LAW § 10:17 (Supp. 2016) (“The
burden is on the parties, not the court, to produce evidence of the value of the
marital property at the dissolution hearing.”).
57. IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5 states:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
property, regardless of whether the contribution was income
producing.
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each
spouse:
(A) before the marriage; or
(B) through inheritance or gift.
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time
the disposition of the property is to become effective,
including the desirability of awarding the family residence
or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods
as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of
any children.
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as
related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related
to:
(A) a final division of property; and (B) a final determination
of the property rights of the parties.
Id. See also SMITHBURN, supra note 56, at § 10:8 (providing a useful
discussion of marital property division factors).
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explicitly address all of them in every case.58
The first statutory factor considers each spouse’s
contribution to the acquisition of the property, regardless of
whether the contribution produced income.59 The contribution
to the marriage need not be financial, allowing courts to reward
the caregiving role that one spouse may have undertaken in
the marriage.60 This is a common feature in other state laws as
well.
The second factor to rebut an equal division in Indiana is if
a spouse owned assets before the marriage, or received them
through gift or inheritance.61 However, it may be difficult to
58. For example, in one case, an appellate court could not infer from the
trial court’s orders:
that it considered all of the statutory factors . . . There is
nothing in either order to suggest that the trial court
considered the present economic circumstances of each
spouse, the future earnings ability of each spouse, or the
conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the
disposition or dissipation of their property.
Montgomery v. Faust, 910 N.E.2d 234, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Consequently, the Court found that the trial court had committed error and
remanded the case. Id. at 240.
59. IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5(1) (2016).
60. For example, one Indiana court stated that:
[t]he income-producing efforts and intangible contributions
of both spouses unite to facilitate the acquisition of marital
property. [Husband’s] contribution of a greater share of
funds to the marriage does not necessarily mean that he
made a larger contribution to the acquisition of the marital
property. Therefore, the trial court’s unequal division of
marital property cannot be sustained on the rationale that
[Husband] earned more income than [Wife] during the
marriage.
Maloblocki v. Maloblocki, 646 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
61. IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5(2) (2016). Examples in Indiana case law of
equal division being rebutted due to the origin of the property—whether
premarital or an inheritance—include a case where the disputed funds were
acquired 11 years before entering in a four-year marriage that were never
commingled with other assets; on the contrary, the funds were earmarked
specifically for future medical expenses arising out of a back injury. Doyle v.
Doyle, 756 N.E.2d 576, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). In another case, the Indiana
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s award of 63% of the total assets
to the husband’s estate and only 37% of the assets to the wife when the
husband had owned property worth approximately $440,000 before the
marriage, and the wife owned property worth approximately $95,000 before
the marriage. Beard v. Beard, 758 N.E.2d 1019, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
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apply this factor in cases of transmutation, which is when
separate property changes its classification to marital property,
or vice versa.62
Transmutation can occur by agreement of the spouses, by
retitling an asset in both spouses’ names, or by giving a gift to
the other spouse.63 In a few states, transmutation may occur
when both spouses use an asset owned separately by only one
of the spouses.64 A common form of transmutation results from
In another Indiana case, the court found that:
while Husband brought various furnishings and personal
items into the marriage, Wife also contributed furniture and
curtains to the marriage.
There was no evidence
documenting the value of the savings account at the time of
the marriage aside from Husband’s unsubstantiated
recollection, let alone whether it was even in existence at
the time of the divorce. Indeed, the majority of the items
Husband had acquired prior to the marriage and for which
he now seeks compensation had long since vanished and
presumably, in the twenty-five years since then, been
replaced by items acquired jointly by the parties . . . It was
within the trial court’s prerogative to determine that the
value of the property Husband brought into the marriage
was not of such great value as to substantially outweigh the
other statutory factors and mandate an even greater
disparity in the division of marital assets.
Akers v. Akers, 729 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
62. “Another factor that can complicate the classification of property is
transmutation or commingling of separate property.”
Amanda Wine,
Comment, Treatment of Personal Injury Awards During Dissolution of
Marriage, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 155, 177 (2006).
63. Laura W. Morgan & Edward S. Snyder, When Title Matters:
Transmutation and the Joint Title Gift Presumption, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
LAW. 335, 340 (2003).
64. See, e.g., id. at 341. For example, in one Rhode Island case, a
husband placed some furniture he had inherited from his father in storage,
and some he placed in the marital home. Quinn v. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848, 851
(R.I. 1986). The court subsequently held that the furniture in storage was his
separate property because he had inherited it, whereas the furniture in his
marital home had transmuted into marital property because the wife also
used it. Id. Consequently, the wife was awarded all of the furniture in the
home. Id. In many cases of transmutation, however, courts analyze the
intent of the spouses and whether they desired the transmutation. For
example, transmutation may be defeated by proof that separate deposits into
marital accounts were made “as a matter of convenience, without the
intention of creating a beneficial interest, and that the funds in the account
originated solely in the separate property of the spouse who claims the
separate interest.” Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 808 N.Y.S.2d 352, 356
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (citations omitted).
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the commingling of separate and marital property to the extent
that they lose their identities, such as money in bank
accounts.65 In such an event, all commingled property becomes
Simply stated, separate and marital
marital property.66
property are commingled when the two types of property are
mixed together such that they lose their identities, making all
the resulting property marital property.67
Importantly, if a spouse can trace an existing asset
through its mutations to its original separate property source,
he or she may keep the asset as separate property.68 Tracing is
essentially a procedure that determines the origin of
commingled property or the source of funds used to acquire an
asset during the marriage. Property can be traced in several
ways, depending on the methods permitted by each state.69
Nonetheless, absent transmutation, a spouse could retain
property at divorce that was owned before the marriage, or

65. J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23
FAM. L.Q. 219, 220 (1989).
66. Morgan & Snyder, supra note 63, at 341.
67. However, some courts will not apply this commingling rule if the
separate property significantly outweighs the marital property, which is the
de minimis exception. See Oldham, supra note 65, at 220. Therefore, if a
spouse deposits $10 of marital money into a separate bank account holding
$10,000 of the other spouse’s separate money, the courts will not consider the
entirety of the account to have transmuted to marital property. See id. at
226.
68. In many states, the general rule is that commingled marital and
separate funds become marital property unless a spouse can explicitly trace
his or her separate property. Indeed, the natural course of a marriage often
unintentionally produces complex commingling situations that obscure the
character of the assets. See id. at 223-24.
69. See, e.g., Joan F. Kessler et al., Tracing to Avoid Transmutation, 17
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 371 (2001). The nine community property states
have developed the most complex tracing rules, but these rules are also used
in equitable distribution states. Each state may also use different tracing
techniques in different circumstances. For example, a spouse may trace
commingled property to separate property by showing that, at the time of
purchase, there was no marital property, so the purchase must have
necessarily been made with separate funds.
Similarly, the “total
recapitulation” method permits a spouse to prove that a specific asset was
purchased with separate funds by showing that marital expenses exceeded
marital income over the entire course of the marriage.
Id. at 377.
Alternatively, in “direct tracing,” the sole-owning spouse can produce records
showing that a particular purchase was made with separate funds. See, e.g.,
id.
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received through gift or inheritance.
The third statutory factor in Indiana used to rebut an
equal division of property upon divorce is the economic
circumstances of each spouse after the divorce.70 This includes
the desirability of awarding the family residence or its use to
the spouse having custody of the children.71 This factor
facilitates judicial discretion regarding the appropriate
property division between divorcing spouses.
The fourth factor to rebut an equal division upon divorce in
Indiana is the spouses’ conduct during the marriage in regards
to the disposition or dissipation of their property.72 Here, the
vestiges of a fault regime are clear: bad behavior by a spouse
used to impact property distribution at divorce.73 Although
there are still a few states that continue to allow fault to
influence the property division, Indiana has joined the majority
that does not consider fault when dividing assets,74 except in
the case of dissipation of marital assets.75 This illustrates the
70.
71.
72.
73.

IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5(3) (2016).
See supra Part II.
IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5(4) (2016).
Professor Cohen of Ono Academic College, Law School, stated:
In family law, vagueness surrounds this term [“fault”].
Nevertheless, “fault” can, in principle, be divided into three
categories: “economic fault,” expressed by inappropriate
economic behavior, such as lack of contribution to the family
effort, waste of the family’s assets, etc.; “violent fault,”
expressed in physical or psychological violence of one spouse
towards the other; and, finally, “sexual fault,” expressed by
inappropriate sexual behavior of one of the spouses,
primarily a romantic extramarital relationship.
Yitshak Cohen, Extramarital Relationships and the Theoretical Rationales
for the Joint Property Rules—A New Model, 80 MO. L. REV. 131, 133-34
(2015).
74. See Peter Nash Swisher, The ALI Principles: A Farewell to Fault—
But What Remedy for the Egregious Marital Misconduct of an Abusive
Spouse?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 213, 218 n.29 (2001) (citing Peter Nash
Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L. Q. 269,
301-02 n.113 (1997)).
75. Nonetheless, the Indiana courts cannot take dissipation of assets to
the extreme. One Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial
court’s decision, determining that:
[t]he tenor of the court’s statement is punitive and reflects
that the court considered Husband responsible for the
breakup of the marriage. However, the conduct of the
parties during the marriage, aside from conduct relating to
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uniqueness of economic fault, whose adverse effect on a spouse
is worthy of a judicial remedy.
The Indiana Court of Appeals has characterized waste and
misuse of marital assets as the hallmarks of dissipation, noting
that the frivolous or unjustified spending of marital assets,
including the concealment of marital property, qualifies as
dissipation:
The test for dissipation is whether the assets
were actually wasted or misused. . . . In
determining whether dissipation has occurred, a
court should consider: (1) whether the
dissipating party had the intent to hide, deplete,
or divert the marital asset; (2) whether the
expenditure benefited the marital enterprise or
was made for a purpose entirely unrelated to the
marriage; (3) whether the transaction was
remote in time and effect or occurred just before
the filing of a divorce petition; and (4) whether
the expenditure was excessive or de minimis.76
The final factor in rebutting equal division between
divorcing spouses in Indiana is the earnings or earning ability
of the parties as related to a final division of property and a
final determination of the property rights of the parties.77 In
this category, a spouse’s health issues78 or lengthy break from
paid work to care for the family can have an impact on the
property division.79 This last factor concedes that the concept
the disposition or dissipation of property, is irrelevant to the
court’s division of property.
Norton v. Norton, 573 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citing In re
Marriage of R.E.G., 571 N.E.2d 298, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)).
76. Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(citing Goodman v. Goodman, 754 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).
77. IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5(5) (2016).
78. Irwin v. Irwin, 406 N.E.2d 317, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(determining that the trial court did not err in considering the wife’s ill
health, which was relevant to her earning ability and economic
circumstances).
79. In re Marriage of Snemis, 575 N.E.2d 650, 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
Here, the trial court did not commit error by failing to award Husband more
than 50 percent of the marital property, “considering Wife’s long hiatus from
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of fairness cannot be distilled into an oversimplified formula,
and equal division is not necessarily the fairest approach in
light of certain facts specific to individual marriages.
Thus, applying any of these factors may result in an
unequal property division in an Indiana divorce.80 In other
words, despite the presumption of equal division, a more
nuanced approach is possible with the various statutory factors
to rebut it.
As a result, judges have significant discretion in Indiana
on matters of property division, illustrating that an equal
division may not achieve a fair result in every case. The lower
court must only provide its reasons for an unequal division,81
which receives deference on appeal.82
The division of assets between the spouses is final.
Modification of a court’s property award is difficult. Usually,
there must be a significant reason, like fraud, for a court to set
aside a property award.83

the work force in order to serve as a homemaker, an exclusive role which
Husband encouraged; Wife’s homemaking contributions to the marriage; her
physical limitations and age; and Husband’s greater earning ability as a
business owner.” Id.
80. In one case, the appellate court affirmed an allocation of marital
assets as consistent with these statutory factors, which supported an unequal
property division. See Hitchcox v. Hitchcox, 693 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998). The trial court determined that the wife merited more than an equal
division of the marital property based on the extent to which she supported
both parties during the marriage, that she had acquired “nearly all of the
marital assets prior to the marriage, that her financial contributions to the
maintenance of those assets exceeded [the husband’s] contributions, that
some marital assets were disposed of in [the husband’s] unprofitable
business, and that [the husband] now has some earning ability.” Id. at 632.
81.
See Berger v. Berger, 648 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
(“[T]he trial court may divide the marital property unequally provided the
court sets forth its reasons for so doing.”). See also Campbell v. Campbell,
993 N.E.2d 205, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“A trial court may deviate from an
equal division so long as it sets forth a rational basis for its decision.”).
82. See, e.g., Love v. Love, 10 N.E.3d 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
83. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-15-7-9.1 (2016) (“(a) The orders concerning
property disposition entered under this chapter (or IC 31-1-11.5-9 before its
repeal) may not be revoked or modified, except in case of fraud. (b) If fraud is
alleged, the fraud must be asserted not later than six (6) years after the order
is entered.”).
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C. Alimony
Alimony, known as spousal support or maintenance in
some states including Indiana, is the payment of a lump sum or
on a continuing basis by one spouse for the support and
maintenance of the other spouse after divorce.84 It is awarded
in addition to property division and child support. Although it
has gendered roots, either spouse may receive maintenance at
divorce today.85
Alimony has become unpopular in many states, with limits
placed on its availability.
For example, in Indiana,
maintenance is available only in three circumstances: 1) for as
long as a spouse cannot support himself or herself due to a
physical or mental incapacity, 2) for as long as appropriate
when a spouse cannot support himself or herself due to a
physically or mentally incapacitated child, or 3) up to 3 years of
“rehabilitative maintenance” based on a) the educational level
of each spouse, b) interruptions in a spouse’s education,
training, or employment based on homemaking or caregiving
responsibilities, c) “the earning capacity of each spouse,” and d)
“the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education
or training to enable the spouse who is seeking maintenance to
find appropriate employment.”86 This represents the trend of
limits placed on alimony by state legislatures in recent years.
Courts often prefer property division to alimony because it
provides a clean break.87 Unlike an alimony award, a property
84. See, e.g., 24A AM. JUR. 2D DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 668 (Supp.
2017).
85. In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court held
that Alabama’s sex-based alimony law, reflecting unjustified stereotypes,
violates equal protection. See id.
86. IND. CODE § 31-15-7-2 (2016). However, this provision has not
eliminated litigation on maintenance. For example, in the time period
between October 1, 2012 and September 30, 2013, litigants brought several
cases on maintenance in the Indiana courts. See, e.g., Banks v. Banks, 980
N.E.2d 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); Alexander v. Alexander, 980 N.E.2d 878
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
87. See, e.g., Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at
Divorce: A Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1209-10
(1999). Professor Bryan stated:
[T]he law currently expresses a preference for a “clean
break” at divorce. At most, the wife is entitled to short-term
rehabilitative maintenance; judges disfavor permanent
maintenance because the wife’s continued dependence on
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award is not ongoing. Although it is not always easy for one
spouse to be awarded alimony, modification or termination by
the other spouse is difficult.88
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Given this legal framework, the next step is to examine
whether Indiana judicial decisions stay within this framework.
In other words, the question is how the courts apply the
statutory law. While individual cases have been decided on
these issues, no data analysis on a compilation of them has
been done. Yet, such an analysis is important because it shows
the level of discretion courts use and how they use it.

her husband interferes with the clean break between
spouses. Wives, or their attorneys, cannot successfully
negotiate for maintenance that judges will not award.
Id. See also Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? Examining the Consequences
of Post-Dissolution Parenting, 41 FAM. L. Q. 105 (2007). Professor Glennon of
Temple University stated:
The coparenting approach to post-dissolution parenting falls
into sharp conflict with the economic clean break model,
under which divorced persons and cohabitants who part
ways are entirely separate individuals, unencumbered by
ongoing legal or financial relationships, free to build new
lives and make a fresh start. Under this view, alimony after
divorce is disfavored, and new economic disadvantages that
arise from events that occur post-divorce are legally
irrelevant.
Id. at 105-06.
88. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-15-7-3 (2016):
Provisions of an order with respect to maintenance ordered
under section 1 of this chapter (or IC 31-1-11.5-9(c) before
its repeal) may be modified or revoked. Except as provided
in IC 31-16-8-2, modification may be made only:
(1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial
and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable; or
(2) upon a showing that:
(A) a party has been ordered to pay an amount in child
support that differs by more than twenty percent (20%) from
the amount that would be ordered by applying the child
support guidelines; and
(B) the order requested to be modified or revoked was issued
at least twelve (12) months before the petition requesting
modification was filed.
Id.
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A. The Empirical Data
The data for this Article consists of divorces filed during
three months in 2008 in Marion County, Indiana that involved
minor children.89
The number of these cases totaled
90
approximately 110.
These divorce records were coded for multiple variables.
These include who filed for the divorce, who received the
marital home, how the pension was divided, how many
children resulted from the marriage, who received custody of
the children, and how parenting time was divided.91
In approximately half of the cases in the sample, the
marital home was owned.92 There was no guaranteed link
between child custody and the award of the home or its use.93
Approximately half of the couples in the sample had a
pension to divide.94 In approximately half of the couples with
pensions, each member of the couple had an individual
pension. In the vast majority of these cases, each member kept
the full amount of that pension. In other words, pensions were
generally not divided if each member of the couple had a
pension. In many of the remaining couples with pensions, only
one member of the couple had a pension, and it was divided
between the divorcing spouses, often with each spouse taking
half.95
When it comes to spousal support, out of the
approximately 110 cases, the courts awarded it only in three
cases.96 All of the recipients of these awards were women.97
B. The Implications
Given the statutory background, the question is how the
courts have been dividing property between divorcing couples
89.
author].
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

The data are on file with the author [hereinafter Data on file with
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Data on file with author, supra note 89.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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in the pursuit of fairness. Many people’s wealth consists of two
major assets: the marital home and retirement funds; thus, it
is important to look at the data regarding these two factors
when considering property division at divorce.98
As seen in the empirical data, the custodial parent did not
necessarily receive the marital home. Thus, despite the option
to link the house to child custody, courts more directly
addressed children in child support determinations.
Regarding their retirement, divorcing spouses were
generally able to keep their own pensions in full if both of them
had a pension. Otherwise, the pension would often be divided
equally between the divorcing spouses. This shows not only
that the courts adhered to the Indiana legislature’s
understanding of fairness as an equal property division, but
also that the proper division often required splitting the
pension when there was only one.
Despite the trend towards equal property division, there
was no formulaic approach that the Indiana courts generally
used to divide the property between the spouses to achieve an
equal distribution. It is clear that the details of the property
division remained in the discretion of the courts today in
Indiana, as in many other states.
The Indiana courts were far more mechanical in limiting
spousal support, applying the restrictions set forth in the
Indiana Code. Spousal support was awarded in only a few
cases, with Indiana joining those states limiting it to special
circumstances.
In sum, Indiana courts followed legislative guidance, both
in terms of reducing maintenance and starting the property
division at an equal division.
While predictability and
consistency are gained by legislative formulae, the courts can
accomplish individual justice in divorce cases by having
significant discretion, as seen through the property awards.99
98. See supra Part II.
99. “In deciding between a system of fixed rules and one of judicial
discretion in family law disputes, the key issue on which to focus is the extent
to which the family law system provides justice for the individual parties.”
Theodore K. Cheng, A Call for a New Fixed Rule: Imposition of Child Support
Orders Against Recipients of Means-Tested Public Benefits, 1995 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 647, 653 (1996).
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Furthermore, although the Indiana legislature has decided
that an equal division is fairest to the divorcing couple, an
equal property division can be reached by several
arrangements of property, over which the courts maintained
their discretion.
Indeed, individual justice is the aim of divorce law. Yet,
the standard for property division in divorce is fairness, and
there is no universal equation or definition of fairness.100 Thus,
legislative intervention in family law formulae has its limits
because the facts vary among divorce cases.101 While it is
relatively straightforward to legislate an equal property
division starting point, it is far more difficult to legislate
beyond this because there are so many different property
scenarios.
This necessarily preserves a role for the judiciary.
Creating completely formulaic rules to property division at
divorce, devoid of any judicial discretion, would be a major
departure from the current law and would require a
reimagining of the current approach to family law.102 Indeed,
family law is on the bridge between legislative formula and
judicial discretion, with a role for each.
In addition to the role for the judiciary, there is a role for
contracting by a couple, albeit with the court’s oversight. Even
couples with a settlement agreement must receive approval
from the courts.103
Just as the government regulates
100. See supra Part II.
101. But see Cheng, supra note 99, at 647 (“Throughout the 1980s, there
was a growing consensus that the broad judicial discretion exercised in family
law disputes was causing dire socio-economic consequences for the parties
involved and undermining the orderly and equitable resolution of disputes in
child custody, child support, alimony, and property distribution.”).
102. For an excellent discussion of the reimagining family law, see JILL
ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED (2014).
103. Professor Sharp of University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
stated:
Within the past two decades, however, there has been an
even greater demand for a minimizing of such state
intervention and for a more unfettered application of simple
contract principles to marital agreements . . . Separation
agreements . . . have tended to be swept into both the
argument and the conclusion that marital contracts should,
in general, be accorded the same judicial treatment as any
other contract.
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marriage,104 it regulates divorce.
Nonetheless, couples enjoy strong contractual autonomy in
the United States,105 and they have an incentive to use it in the
current legal framework. As seen in the empirical analysis, it
is far easier to predict that a property division will resemble an
equal division than how that division will be achieved. The
court’s priority is to get an equal division, rather than any
particular division. If couples want a particular property
division guaranteed, then they should enter into a premarital
agreement. However, often people’s optimism about marriage
prevents them from entering into such agreements.106
Alternatively, couples might be encouraged to settle their
divorce after their marriage ends, instead of before, to retain
control. These empirical results help illustrate for them what
is fair in the property division according to the Indiana courts
in the context of the statutory framework.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article analyzes empirical data from divorce cases
filed during three months in 2008 involving children in Marion
County, Indiana to find patterns in the outcomes of divorce
cases on property division, particularly in regard to retirement
savings and the marital home. The goal is to examine not only
what the courts are doing in family law, but also to highlight
the underlying law to determine the correlation between the
family law code and judicial outcomes.
The results of this empirical work are a helpful glimpse
into the meaning of justice in divorce cases today. While it
Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A
Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1401-03
(1984).
104. For example, relatives closer than first cousins cannot marry, and
first cousins can marry only once they reach sixty-five years of age. IND.
CODE § 31-11-1-2 (2016). Other government regulations and restrictions on
marriage have fallen over the decades. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding state bans on same-sex marriage
unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding state bans on
interracial marriage unconstitutional).
105. See Ryznar & Stepień-Sporek, supra note 14.
106. See Williams, supra note 3, at 738.
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does seem that Indiana courts are following the state statutes
limiting maintenance awards and using an equal division as a
starting point, there is no easy formula or pattern to predict
exact property divisions. If couples want more predictability,
they should enter into agreements, either at the beginning or
end of their marriage. These lessons hold for many other
states who have a similar legal framework as Indiana.
The results of an empirical analysis can help shape the
policy debate and inform state legislators who might want to
see how their laws are being implemented. Most importantly,
they can help judges know what is happening in the landscape
of family law, such as whether they are being consistent and
whether they are doing justice in the way that they would like.
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